A Reply to Leigland's "Is a New Version of Philosophical Pragmatism Necessary? A Reply to Barnes-Holmes" Dermot Barnes-Holmes National University of Ireland, Maynooth In Leigland's (2003) reply to my article, "Behavioral Pragmatism: No Place for Reality and Truth" (BarnesHolmes, 2000) , he states that it "raises a number of excellent points and appropriately and productively expands the literature relating behavior analysis to pragmatist philosophy" (p. 298), and that it contains "excellent points in [the] descriptions of a number of important issues" (p. 302). Naturally, I was pleased to receive such high praise from a colleague, whose own work I have come to admire and respect greatly over the years. However, Leigland also questions the article's narrow focus on the work of the pragmatist philosopher, Quine (1960 Quine ( , 1974 Quine ( , 1990 than philosophically (at least in the traditional sense). Certainly, I could have used arguments from Rorty (e.g., 1989 ) and other pragmatist philosophers to counter Hayes' argument. However, Hayes may have retorted, quite reasonably, that her arguments were not directed primarily at pragmatist philosophers but rather at behavioral scientists who claimed to be adopting pragmatic truth criteria. A counterargument to Hayes, therefore, required the response of a scientist who employs the pragmatic truth criterion of successful working. Consequently, I described the emergence, expression, and application of pragmatic strategies within the science of behavior analysis, as I have personally experienced them as a scientist, and I labeled this experience behavioral pragmatism. In so doing, I hoped to demonstrate that utility-based truth, at least for me, does not, upon close scrutiny, collapse into correspondence-based truth. In light of Leigland's generally positive comments pertaining to many of the points contained in my article, I presume that I was successful, at least from Leigland's perspective, in defending the concept of utility-based truth within behavior analysis.
Given that one of my main goals was to address the verbal and nonverbal practices of behavior analysts who describe themselves as pragmatists, one might ask why I focused so much attention on the work of Quine (1960, 1974, 1990) . In fact, an earlier version of the article did not contain the material on Quine or his concept of the observation sentence. However, on the recommendation of an anonymous reviewer who pointed out Quine's close DERMOT BARNES-HOLMES association with behavioral psychology, it seemed reasonable to review his work. In retrospect, I think the article benefited considerably from this review, but I maintain that it was not a necessary part of the core defense of the utility-based truth criterion within the discipline of behavior analysis. In my view, what I describe as behavioral pragmatism, in and of itself, provides the appropriate and adequate defense.
Behavioral Pragmatism: Why Introduce a New Label?
The fundamental assumptions of what I call behavioral pragmatism, and the implications arising thereof, are broadly consistent with, and in part derived from, much of the writing already found within pragmatist philosophy. As I indicated in the original article, the work of Rorty (1989) provides one example, and indeed there are others, such as Putnam (1981, 1987) and Rouse (1987 Rouse's (1987) practical hermeneutics holds that skills ("knowing how") precede theoretical knowledge ("knowing that"), thus leading to the conclusion that all knowledge is local, situated from the perspective of an embodied agent, and rooted in practical daily activities. This view seems to overlap with what S. C. Hayes (1993 Hayes ( , 1997 calls functional contextualism (engineering is provided as a typical model), and in particular the distinction he draws between verbal and nonverbal knowing. The work of other pragmatist philosophers is also reflected in some of the writings and practices of behavior analysis, but in each case there are also differences that are often subtle and complex in nature (see, e.g., Roche & Barnes-Holmes, 2003, for a detailed examination of the similarities and differences between behavior analysis and one modem incarnation of the pragmatist tradition in the form of social constructionism). none of this philosophical writing, as far as I am aware, is cast in the scientific language of behavior analysis. In contrast, behavioral pragmatism employs this language (e.g., BarnesHolmes, 2000, p. 199; see also Barnes & Roche, 1997) . In my view, therefore, the use of the term behavioral pragmatism seemed justified, in part, because I could not find a widely recognized pragmatist philosopher who employed the language of behavior analysis. Parenthetically, I also noted that I was unwilling to employ the label radical behaviorism, because at least some individuals would disagree with behavioral pragmatism, or some parts of it, and yet consider themselves to be radical behaviorists (cf. Barnes & Roche, 1994) .
One might argue at this point that the use of behavior-analytic terminology in my discussion and definition of behavioral pragmatism involves conflating science and philosophy in a rather unorthodox manner. Indeed, this may be so, and I am happy to admit to the "crime" of unorthodoxy. For me, engaging in the science of behavior analysis involves, ipso facto, adopting the type of pragmatic approach to science that I outlined in the article. In other words, the science and the philosophy are not independent domains-they are, in a sense, continuous (cf. Callebaut, 1993) . And here again, I found another basis for the conjunction of the words behavioral and pragmatism.
Another reason underlying the use of the term behavioral pragmatism is actually identified by Leigland when he writes, for example, "the diverse positions taken among the pragmatist philosophers regarding truth are extraordinarily complex" (p. 301) and also when he points out that behavior analysis, as a scientific field, has a "different set of goals, methods, and problems" (p. 302) from that of philosophical pragmatism. The debates within philosophical pragmatism are indeed diverse and complex, and thus I believe there is some benefit in attempting to extract a relatively simple
